They wouldn't need to outlaw or ban all cryptography, only the particular communication systems that don't have "lawful intercept" capability. There are already laws for this on the books, although they've generally been interpreted in such a way so as not to apply to non-telephony products so far.
TBH it probably wouldn't require that much Orwellian apparatus; you just make the software slightly harder to use than it already is today, and network effects basically ensure that only people who are really interested in communications without government interception (who the government is presumably interested in) are using it. Then you can start doing endpoint attacks, deanonymization via compromised downloads, etc.
The government's -- and I don't mean just the U.S.'s, but most large governments', I think -- ideal for Internet communications is something similar to the telephone network circa 1975. They're fine with privacy between one individual and another (i.e. keeping your conversations private from your neighbors), but they aren't going to be satisfied with any technology that prevents wiretaps by state-controlled apparatus.
I am not exactly bullish on the ability of technology or technologists to resist this, over the long run. Unless there is a widespread and overwhelming realization on the part of individuals that governments shouldn't have this ability, and I don't think that consensus exists even in the liberal West if you frame the question even moderately advantageously to the government, then they will get it. There will always be pockets of noncompliance, and an ensuing cat-and-mouse game, but the steady state will likely be one that deters mainstream usage.
And if we really are seeing the end of Anglo-American geopolitical dominance in favor of countries whose political systems emphasize stability and harmony over individual rights and dissent, then it becomes very difficult to see that consensus ever manifesting itself at a meaningful global level.
TBH it probably wouldn't require that much Orwellian apparatus; you just make the software slightly harder to use than it already is today, and network effects basically ensure that only people who are really interested in communications without government interception (who the government is presumably interested in) are using it. Then you can start doing endpoint attacks, deanonymization via compromised downloads, etc.
The government's -- and I don't mean just the U.S.'s, but most large governments', I think -- ideal for Internet communications is something similar to the telephone network circa 1975. They're fine with privacy between one individual and another (i.e. keeping your conversations private from your neighbors), but they aren't going to be satisfied with any technology that prevents wiretaps by state-controlled apparatus.
I am not exactly bullish on the ability of technology or technologists to resist this, over the long run. Unless there is a widespread and overwhelming realization on the part of individuals that governments shouldn't have this ability, and I don't think that consensus exists even in the liberal West if you frame the question even moderately advantageously to the government, then they will get it. There will always be pockets of noncompliance, and an ensuing cat-and-mouse game, but the steady state will likely be one that deters mainstream usage.
And if we really are seeing the end of Anglo-American geopolitical dominance in favor of countries whose political systems emphasize stability and harmony over individual rights and dissent, then it becomes very difficult to see that consensus ever manifesting itself at a meaningful global level.