Thanks for the link, whose article is understandable by non-security technology types like myself.
Here are some limitations to the T2 vulnerability which give those of us with T2-equipped devices less to fret about:
> There are a few important limitations of the jailbreak, though, that keep this from being a full-blown security crisis. The first is that an attacker would need physical access to target devices in order to exploit them. The tool can only run off of another device over USB. This means hackers can't remotely mass-infect every Mac that has a T2 chip. An attacker could jailbreak a target device and then disappear, but the compromise isn't "persistent"; it ends when the T2 chip is rebooted. The Checkra1n researchers do caution, though, that the T2 chip itself doesn't reboot every time the device does. To be certain that a Mac hasn't been compromised by the jailbreak, the T2 chip must be fully restored to Apple's defaults. Finally, the jailbreak doesn't give an attacker instant access to a target's encrypted data. It could allow hackers to install keyloggers or other malware that could later grab the decryption keys, or it could make it easier to brute-force them, but Checkra1n isn't a silver bullet.
If the device is left unattended at a border crossing and it is taken away to a back room, you should just assume its been hacked or modified and shouldn't trust it again.
I wasn't referring to someone leaving/forgetting/losing a device. I'm talking about carry your devices through border inspection, and having those agents confiscate your devices.
